Study of Moroccan companies' behavior towards VAT: between economic neutrality and incentives for tax fraud

Abstract

Embedded in a liberal approach based on the "invisible hand" of the market, the pursuit of economic neutrality of VAT, in the context of perfectly competitive markets, demands that this tax creates no economic distortion for businesses and remains invisible to consumers, thereby promoting optimal allocation of resources. The objective of this article is to verify two hypotheses: firstly, that VAT in Morocco generates a surplus on production costs, thus causing economic distortion and hindering the proper functioning of businesses; secondly, that these surcharges incentivize businesses to seek means to reduce these costs, to conceal income, or to avoid tax obligations, potentially leading to harmful effects on the Moroccan economy and society. Our methodology is systematic, comprising a literature review and critical analysis, during which we examined a wide range of works to analyze the implications of VAT on production costs and its consequences on business performance. The results of our study, both theoretical and empirical, reveal that the countless exemptions as well as the Moroccan VAT rate differentiation policy cause a disruption in the deduction chain. This disruption generates "VAT remnants" in the selling price, prompting double taxation and potentially compromising the neutrality of VAT, as well as a situation that could lead to the "butoir" rule. This issue can threaten the cash flow balance of the company, especially if the "butoir" persists and becomes chronic. This suggests a reform of VAT to make it more neutral and less distorting, as well as the implementation of measures to combat tax fraud and income concealment.

Keywords: VAT, tax neutrality, economic distortion, VAT fraud, production cost

JEL Classification : K34, H20, H26, H32

Paper type : Theoretical Research